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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 From California’s humble beginnings to its status now as the most populated state 
in America, the acquisition and distribution of water has always played a key role in the 
state’s development. Whether that water comes from California or is outsourced from 
another state, California possesses one prize of water that has been the center of 
agricultural, environmental, and economic contention for several decades. The Bay-
Delta, which is comprised of the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta and San Francisco 
Bay, is the second largest estuary in the United States.1 Dating back to the gold rush, the 
Central Valley has always been coveted for its ideal geographic location right beside 
rivers that would flood during wet seasons into the land, producing some of the richest, 
most fertile soil in the West.2 However, precipitation and the areas that would flood were 
never consistent. This eventually led settlers to build flood control projects, levee 
systems, and dams in the early 20th century that allowed water to be captured, so that 
agriculture could prosper. Unfortunately, the Delta started to face supply problems as 
early as 1920 when populations in both Northern and Southern California were rising 
exponentially in proportion to the expansion of agriculture.3 Reclamation and eventual 
restoration became the primary goals for the Delta in the 20th Century, although more 
water continued to be pumped out of it. The competing water interests between the north 
                                                     
1
 California Department of Fish and Game, “WAP – Bay Delta & Central Valley – Overview,” 
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/wildlife/wap/region-bay_delta-central_valley.html (accessed April 14, 2012). 
2
 Hundley, Jr., Norris, The Great Thirst: Californians and Water--A History. Rev. ed. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2001), 234-35. 
3
 Ibid, 237-40. 
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and south, agriculture and environmentalists, are now better described as California’s 
“water wars”.4  
 Today, tensions are higher than ever as Southern California continues to grow and 
demand water from the Delta, agriculture suffers from drought and less-than-promised 
water allocations, and aquatic life diminishes due to environmentally damaging processes 
like pumping and exporting of water elsewhere. In 1994, two years after a six-year 
drought that sent all of the Central Valley into panic, the CALFED Bay-Delta Program 
was created.5 Stakeholders and governmental agencies came together to develop a set of 
water quality standards and the Bay-Delta Accord, an agreement to work towards 
solutions for improving the Delta and its water supply.6 Unfortunately, CALFED never 
fully accomplished its goals of Delta reform. Within 10 years, California had to once 
again evaluate how to address issues in the Bay-Delta because there were no measurable 
results from CALFED. What California ended up having in hand at the end of 10 years 
was primarily a disorganized handful of reports and proposals that were never pushed to 
implementation. As admirable as CALFED was for its intentions to save the Delta, it 
lacked the leadership necessary to achieve real results. Additionally, the lack of 
agreement amongst stakeholders made the possibility of implementation more difficult. 
Despite an attempt to refocus CALFED from 2005-2006, movement was still slow with 
no immediate, practical solutions, especially when another drought hit from 2007-2009.  
Californians’ patience wore thin; it was time for a change. CALFED saw its death in 
                                                     
4
 Morris, Bob, "California Water Wars Spotlight: San Joaquin Valley," Independent Voter Network (IVN) - 
Non-Profit Unfiltered Political News. http://ivn.us/2012/03/21/water-wars-central-valley-focus/ (accessed 
April 14, 2012). This is just one example of the numerous articles highlighting the Delta region as one of 
the main battlegrounds for the water wars.  
5
 CALFED Bay-Delta Program Archived Website, "History of CALFED Bay-Delta Program,"  
http://calwater.ca.gov/calfed/about/History/Detailed.html (accessed April 14, 2012). 
6
 Ibid. 
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2009 when the Delta Stewardship Council was formed. This new, smaller council of 
legislators vow to put forth the Delta Plan, a comprehensive Delta-management proposal 
intended to be law when completed.7 Part of the Delta Plan proposes conservation 
strategies for the Bay-Delta; this proposal that has been separately prepared by various 
agencies is called the Bay-Delta Conservation Plan (BDCP). In addition to explaining the 
reasons why CALFED failed, this paper will take a specific focus on what the BDCP 
proposes, the potential impacts, criticism and support for the plan, and an analysis of its 
potential to resolve issues in the Delta.  
 Apart from the work of state and local agencies on the Bay-Delta Conservation 
Plan, a few members of the House of Representatives are taking their ideas for Delta 
reform to the federal level. On May 11, 2011, Congressman Devin Nunes (CA-21) 
introduced in the House his bill (H.R. 1837) entitled “The Sacramento-San Joaquin 
Valley Reliability Act”.8 Nunes and his co-sponsors, Jeff Denham and Kevin McCarthy, 
are all representatives of districts in the Central Valley, specifically counties south of the 
Delta where agriculture is a mainstay of the economy. After watching their constituencies 
face the harsh drought that ended in 2009, these Congressmen could stand by no longer to 
wait for another potentially unproductive plan, like CALFED, to rob their counties of 
their needed water allocations. Unlike the Delta Stewardship Council’s establishment as 
an improved CALFED committee, H.R. 1837 aims to improve upon previous federal 
legislation. The Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) and San Joaquin River 
                                                     
7
 Delta Stewardship Council, "How does the Delta Stewardship Council differ from previous efforts – such 
as CALFED – to manage the Delta?" http://deltacouncil.ca.gov/faq/12-how-does-delta-stewardship-
council-differ-previous-efforts-%E2%80%93-such-calfed-%E2%80%93-manage-delta (accessed April 14, 
2012). 
8
 "Bill Summary & Status - 112th Congress (2011 - 2012) - H.R.1837 - All Congressional Actions," 
THOMAS (Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR01837:@@@X 
(accessed April 14, 2012). 
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Restoration Settlement Act were passed in Congress in 1992 and 2009, respectively.9 10 
Both laws intended to address the environmental impacts of the Central Valley Project on 
fish and wildlife habitats. The San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act falls under 
the CVPIA’s San Joaquin River Restoration section, but now comes under fire by HR 
1837. After several years of investment into the restoration, habitats are still in danger 
and farmers are without enough water. H.R. 1837 proposes to nullify the river settlement 
and also heavily amend the CVPIA. Following the section on the Bay-Delta Conservation 
Plan, this paper will also present in detail what H.R. 1837 proposes, its potential impacts, 
public reception of the bill, and an analysis of how effective a solution it may be to water 
transfer issues in the Delta.  
 Though there may currently be other proposals for improving the Delta, H.R. 
1837 and BDCP will be the focus here because they are two of the most widely 
publicized and heavily discussed Delta plans in 2012. Both also take a similar focus on 
reforming previous legislation pertaining to water transfers and habitat preservation, but a 
side-by-side comparison of the two plans reveal stark differences and conflicts between 
them. There is a lot of criticism and support for both plans, making them each extremely 
contentious. When examined together, USGS foresees the efforts of the BDCP being 
futile, if H.R. 1837 is passed into law because H.R. 1837 would preempt state laws and 
                                                     
9
 "Bill Summary & Status - 102nd Congress (1991 - 1992) - H.R.429 - All Congressional Actions," 
THOMAS (Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d102:HR00429:@@@X 
(accessed April 14, 2012). The CVPIA was passed within this Reclamation law on 10/30/1992. 
10
 "Bill Summary & Status - 111th Congress (2009 - 2010) H.R.146 All Congressional Actions." THOMAS 
(Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/D?d111:3:./temp/~bdxjqP:@@@X|/home/LegislativeData.php?n=BSS;c=111| (accessed April 
14, 2012). Despite being a court settlement that was reached in 2006, the San Joaquin River Restoration 
Settlement Act was a bill that was not passed for implementation until the “Omnibus land bill” was passed 
into law on 3/30/2009. This law included the settlement, which is now brought back into questioning 
through HR 1837.  
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override foundational environmental regulations already in place like the Endangered 
Species Act.11  This issue leads to bigger questions. Will the commonly-deemed “water 
wars” over the Delta ever end? Can H.R. 1837 or the BDCP offer a balanced solution?  
 Based on past record, finding an effective solution for the Bay-Delta may not be 
as simple as what H.R. 1837 or the BDCP present. For decades, attempts to deal with the 
Delta have been met with indecision and lack of clarity when it comes to where water 
goes and how much of it goes there. Every year’s water supply is different, so a 
comprehensive solution needs to handle that unpredictability, but also be fair in 
allocations of water. Some scholars, later discussed in this paper, argue over whether or 
not the Delta is a zero-sum game, also known as a situation where one person’s gain 
results in a proportional loss from another, thus creating a net change of zero. Ultimately, 
the benefit or loss from the situation is dependent on how stakeholders perceive the 
change. California will never find out if the Delta is a zero-sum game if stakeholders 
cannot cooperate to find one solution. Instead today, there are competing proposals that 
extend the political debate over the Delta and put the estuary into deeper ecological risk 
as time passes. Despite some of the promising suggestions in H.R. 1837 and the Bay-
Delta Conservation Plan, the Delta will remain a problem in the 21st century until 
stakeholders from all perspectives compromise enough to enact a cooperative, clear-cut 
solution.
                                                     
11
 Connor, Michael, "HR 1837, San Joaquin Valley Water Reliability Act," Bureau of Reclamation 
Website. http://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/testimony/detail.cfm?RecordID=1961 (accessed April 14, 2012). 
 
  
Chapter 2: History of Delta Development and the Failure of CALFED 
 The story of how the Delta’s problems have gotten to be so deep-rooted dates 
back to the mid-1800s, just before California’s admittance to the Union. Since the very 
beginning, the Delta has played a central role in California’s growth. This section gives a 
synopsis and explains the important highlights of how the Delta was tamed into 
California’s life source of water, energy, agriculture, and economy; and how the abuse 
and overuse of the Delta has forced California to seek and try out solutions – like the 
Central Valley Project Improvement Act and the CALFED Bay-Delta Plan – for restoring 
the health of the estuary.     
 
From 1848 to the Great Depression: Reclamation and the Rise of California   
Though the gold rush in 1848 was what led thousands of people to come to 
California, the water in the Delta was what led them to settle there. Most people did not 
strike gold, but the moist and fertile soil of the Central Valley showed promise of 
agricultural prosperity. After California became an official state in 1850, the passage of 
the Swamplands Act gave states possession of swamplands for the purpose of 
reclamation.1 Sales of these lands to individuals began in 1858, with around 500,000 
acres available in the Delta. 2 Although there was initially acreage limits to how much 
land one could acquire, much lobbying from landowners and wealthy prospective buyers 
convinced the state to repeal acreage limits in 1868. That led to a huge spike in acres 
                                                     
1
 Lund, Jay R., Envisioning futures for the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, (San Francisco: Public Policy 
Institute of California, 2007), 19-20. 
2
 Ibid, 20.  
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reclaimed from 15,000 acres during the decade 1860-1870, to 92,000 acres during 1870-
1880.3 The Delta’s Reclamation Era continued until the 1930s, during which the last tract 
of land was reclaimed in 1934.4 During these 70 years of reclamation, new landowners 
found themselves battling nature and its unpredictable floods and droughts. In order to 
keep their lands fertile, people began to construct machinery and levees for relief. These 
creations captured water, protected lands from being inundated, and pumped water to 
drier lands.  Agriculture began to gain momentum with this new found control over water 
and the federal government eventually supported landowners and farmers by funding 
levee projects through legislation like the Federal Flood Control Act of 1928.5 In 1900, 
there were 73,000 farms in California; by 1935, that number increased to over 150,000.6 
Against the unpredictability of the arid West, California cultivated one of the most 
productive lands for the U.S. agricultural economy. However, as reclamation slowed and 
growth hit its peak, problems began to surface in the Delta.  
 Beginning in the early 1900s, the Delta faced salinity problems and land 
subsidence, which the U.S. Geological Survey describes to be a land drop that occurs 
when “large amounts of ground water have been withdrawn from certain types of rocks” 
that then fall on themselves.7 Drought, water exports, and mining projects caused salt 
intrusion that eventually became unbearable for agriculture in the Delta. The 1920s 
marked the first lawsuits for excessive diversions of water that led to high salinity in 
                                                     
3
 Ibid, 21.  
4
 Ibid.  
5
 Ibid, 25. 
6
 Hundley, Jr., Norris, The Great Thirst: Californians and Water--A History. Rev. ed. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2001), 240. 
7
 "Land subsidence, USGS Water Science for Schools," USGS Georgia Water Science Center, 
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/earthgwlandsubside.html (accessed April 15, 2012). 
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Delta waters.8 This led to the engineering of solutions for salinity problems. The same 
overuse of the Delta triggered land subsidence, although reclamation itself was the initial 
cause. Material that was used to elevate levees came from within the land itself, so 
reclaimed islands became lower and levees were instable because they were built so 
quickly, without sound engineering principles. Farming techniques such as weed control 
and fertilization required more subsidence, which in turn also created salinity problems.9 
These problems eventually called for state and federal action through a comprehensively 
planned program to capture water runoff and distribute it up and down California, as 
needed. In 1919, Robert B. Marshall proposed a bold plan:  
“His ‘Marshall Plan’ called for a large dam on the upper Sacramento River and 
two aqueducts for varying distances on either side of the Central Valley to 
reclaim vast sections of the Sacramento and especially San Joaquin valleys from 
their current waterless or low-water conditions, to provide water to San 
Francisco Bay cities, to improve the navigability of the Sacramento River, and to 
prevent saltwater intrusion into the Delta.”10 
 
It was a brilliant plan for which Marshall never got his due credit; the proposal was 
rejected 3 times by voters and the California Senate for its hefty $800 million price tag.11 
For a decade, Californians whined for a plan of this magnitude, but did not move forward 
with it because the state had to resolve riparian law issues first. Creating a state water 
plan hinged on the establishment of water rights, which California decided ,in 1928, 
meant a riparian had to put water into “reasonable beneficial use” in order to not have 
water re-appropriated elsewhere.12 This mandate cleared the way for the state to 
appropriate unused water for comprehensive water projects. In 1931, State Engineer 
                                                     
8
 Lund, 28.  
9
 Lund, 29. 
10
 Hundley, 243.  
11
 Ibid.  
12
 Ibid, 245.  
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Edward Hyatt released a state water plan similar to Marshall’s, but with better 
engineering detail and a lower cost.13 The $500-$600 million dollar proposed similar 
projects like a dam on the Sacramento River and an aqueduct to bring more water to 
Southern California. Despite the release of the plan coinciding with the Great Depression, 
it was passed in California in 1933.14 Because the plan showed economic promise coming 
out of the Depression through job creation, President Franklin D. Roosevelt released 
funds to start the construction of the projects in late 1935. The plan was officially titled 
the Central Valley Project.15   
 
Late 1930s – 1960s: Shifting from the Central Valley Project to the State Water Project 
 The Central Valley Project’s (CVP) first project was the Shasta Dam, which 
construction started for in 1938. Following that, the CVP brought about the completion of 
“20 dams and reservoirs, 11 power plants, and 500 miles of major canals, as well as 
conduits, tunnels, and related facilities.”16 These are just a few of the Central Valley 
Project’s several accomplishments in providing fresh water to the San Joaquin Valley, 
generating power, improving navigation of the Sacramento River, and protecting the 
Central Valley from water shortages and floods.17  Salinity management remained a 
problem for the CVP because levee failures continued and salinity control through the 
use of dams was not promising beyond the short term.18 The Central Valley Project 
proved to be successful overall with most of its dams and facilities still serving their 
                                                     
13
 Ibid, 246.  
14
 Ibid. 252.  
15
 Ibid, 255.  
16
 "Project details - Central Valley Project." Bureau of Reclamation . 
http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp?proj_Name=Central+Valley+Project (accessed April 15, 2012). 
17
 Ibid.  
18
 Lund, 33.  
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purposes today, but by the late 1950s, the population boom in California created needs 
beyond the scope of the project; the state needed another project plan to deliver more 
water to more of California. 
 While CVP projects were in progress, many groups in California demanded 
another state plan because they witnessed the immense growth the state experienced after 
World War II and knew the allocation of water had to be re-evaluated. After more than a 
decade of research, public discourse, and formation of special committees, these 
committees drafted the Burns-Porter Act, which was the product from three years of 
discussion and compromise.19 This bill detailed a sub-set of projects to be completed that 
would eventually provide water to 25 million Californians and irrigate 750,000 acres of 
farmland.20 The proposal was invested in the growth of Southern California, so it was a 
contentious bill between northern and southern interests. However, the bill was put on the 
November 1960 ballot and approved by a small margin of 174,000 ballots out of 5.8 
million, which is a difference of merely three-tenths of a percent.21 From that point on, 
the newly passed initiative was named the State Water Project (SWP).  
The first phase of the project “aimed to extend water deliveries from northern 
watersheds to Southern California cities and to farmers in the Tulare Basin that were 
beyond the reach of the CVP.”22  However, balancing southern and northern interests was 
difficult when interested parties of the Delta were concerned with maintaining water 
quality and low salinity to sustain agriculture. Construction began in 1961 of this project, 
                                                     
19
 "California State Water Project-History," California Department of Water Resources, 
http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/history.cfm (accessed April 15, 2012). 
20
 "California State Water Project," California Department of Water Resources, 
http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/index.cfm (accessed April 15, 2012). 
21
 Hundley, 290.  
22
 Lund, 33.  
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the largest undertaking for a water project ever at an estimated total of $1.75 billion 
dollars ($12.7 billion dollars if adjusted for inflation in 2010).23 Today, the State Water 
Project includes “34 storage facilities, reservoirs and lakes; 20 pumping plants; 4 
pumping-generating plants; 5 hydroelectric power plants; and about 701 miles of open 
canals and pipelines.”24 During the construction of these projects in the 1960s, the idea of 
building a peripheral canal was proposed for the first time, the first of several times to 
come. This original 1940’s concept proposes the construct of a conveyance line that 
delivers freshwater from the north to the south. The idea seemed to be the ultimate 
solution for moving water from Northern California to Southern California. The 
California Department of Water Resources officially adopted the peripheral canal as part 
of the SWP in 1966 because it was publicly well-received.25 The U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation released an economic feasibility evaluation of the canal project in 1969 and 
its endorsement of the project to Congress, but the dawning of public environmental 
awareness shifted discussion about the Delta and the canal.26     
 
Late 1960s – 1987: The Environmental Awakening  
As the State Water Project was picking up momentum, so was public 
environmentalism. Several environmental protections measures were drafted and passed 
beginning with the National Wilderness Preservation Act of 1964. Following that, the 
Endangered Species Act first passed in 1966, with its revised version passing in 1973. 
Other relevant policies passed in this period were “the National Wild and Scenic Rivers 
                                                     
23
 Water Education Foundation , "California State Water Project Slideshow," Aquafornia - The California 
Water News Blog, http://aquafornia.com/projects/SWP%20Slideshow (accessed April 15, 2012), 34, 36.  
24
 "California State Water Project," California Department of Water Resources, 
http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/index.cfm (accessed April 15, 2012). 
25
 Lund, 35.  
26
 Ibid. 
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Act (1968), the National Environmental Policy Act (1969), the Clean Water Act (1972), 
and the Safe Drinking Water Act (1974).”27 The formation of these laws began to shape 
public attitude towards the environment. Specifically in the Delta, aquatic species and 
wildlife became the spotlight with heavy public interest in protecting them. Previous 
conversations about the peripheral canal were quickly forgotten because there was a 
demand for certainty in its environmental impacts, not just the claimed “intangible 
environmental benefits”.28 New reports on the canal had to be produced in line with new 
environmental regulations, but a 1970 U.S. Geological Survey report and a 1973 
Department of Fish and Game report indicated concern over potential reduction in Delta 
flows.29 Despite the efforts of the Department of Water Resources to put out an 
environmental impact report in 1974 for a slightly modified version of the 1969 
peripheral canal proposal, environmental groups had already publicly exposed the project 
for its potential harm to the environment. Before the environmental impact report’s 
release, a student discovered a preliminary task force report on the canal by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency that condemned the project and recommended that 
“north coast water development for export should not be allowed.”30 The student shared 
this report with the environmentalist organization “Friends of the Earth”; 
environmentalists quickly made this information public as part of a larger movement to 
ensure that the canal would never be built.31 Through years of complaints and lawsuits, 
environmentalists and Northern water right holders successfully convinced California to 
                                                     
27
 Ibid, 36.  
28
 Ibid, 35.  
29
 Ibid, 37. 
30
 Jackson, W. Turrentine, and Alan M Paterson , "The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta: The Evolution and 
Implementation of Water Policy: An Historical Perspective," (Technical Completion Reports W-501, 
1977), 157-58. 
31
 Ibid.  
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reject the peripheral canal proposal on a veto referendum in 1982, after Governor Jerry 
Brown had signed it into law in July 1980.32 This was a huge victory for Northern water 
users. The next five years marked a period of steady growth in California’s concern with 
the environmental health of the Delta; in the meantime, performance in agriculture also 
remained steady until 1987. 
 
1987-1994: Drought, Central Valley Project Improvement Act, and Bay-Delta Accord 
 Drought hit California beginning in the water year 1987 (October 1, 1986 - 
September 30, 1987) and continued for six years through 1992.33 Because 1986 was a wet 
water year, the impacts did not hit immediately in 1987; however, the drought crept up on 
California so quickly that the Department of Water Resources established a Drought 
Information Center in 1988.34 While this was not the worst drought California had ever 
experienced, the San Joaquin and Sacramento River Basins each suffered their worst 
droughts on record. On April 5, 1988, San Joaquin County was the first county to declare 
a state of drought emergency.35 Agriculture began to decline and a statewide drought was 
declared 14 days later by the Department of Water Resources Director, David Kennedy.  
 Serious conservation and reduction measures had to be implemented statewide, 
which impacted the Delta in agriculture, fish and wildlife habitats, and economic well-
being. By 1990, all three of these areas experienced enormous reductions in water. The 
State Water Project reduced water deliveries to agriculture by 50 percent; according to 
economists in the Department of Water Resources, 1990’s drought period alone cost 
                                                     
32
 Hundley, 326, 331-32. 
33
 Dziegielewski, Benedykt, Hari P. Garbharran, and John F. Langowski, Lessons learned from the 
California drought (1987-1992), (Fort Belvoir, VA.: The Institute for Water Resources, Water Resources 
Support Center - U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1993), 69.  
34
 Ibid, 70.  
35
 Ibid, 76. 
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$455 million dollars to agriculture.36 Given that a majority of agricultural activities 
revolved around the Delta and significant amounts of land had to be fallowed, this cost 
undoubtedly affected the economy. Similar cuts were made to cities with water supplies 
from the Central Valley Project; most cities experienced 25-50 percent in reduced supply 
from the project.37 Both of these cuts negatively affected the economy as farmers 
produced less and residents received less water. Reductions in water for fish and wildlife 
habitats occurred naturally through the drought, but the negative impacts went unnoticed 
until 1990 when the Delta smelt began to attract attention.  In the summer of 1990, there 
was controversy over whether or not the Delta smelt should be listed as a threatened 
species, under the Endangered Species Act because the Department of Water Resources 
and the Fish and Game Commission rejected the initial recommendation.38 However, 
environmentalists continued to push back and finally received the recognition they 
demanded when the Delta smelt was approved for listing under threatened species by the 
U.S. Department of Interior in September 1991.39 Several other species became at risk 
from the moment the drought started, but it was not until years later that the Department 
of Water Resources was able to realize “that the most severe impacts of the drought have 
been on the environment and the fish and wildlife”.40 Unlike the quicker recoveries of 
agriculture and economic health, these environmental impacts were soon discovered to be 
longer-lasting and harder to recover from because the state lacked a concrete plan for 
restoration. 
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 Ibid, 86.  
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid, 82.  
39
 Ibid, 89.  
40
 Ibid, 118. 
15 
 
 In the heat of the six-year drought, a congressman of a bordering district to the 
Delta could not idly watch the declining ecosystem and water quality of the estuary any 
longer, so he took action. Congressman George Miller, who represented the Contra Costa 
County portion of the Central Valley, put forth a series of “fish bills” that he and his staff 
drafted between 1989 and 1991.41 The target of these bills was to make restoration a 
priority of the Central Valley Project, which was the only large-scale federal water 
project in California without much consideration of its impacts on fish and wildlife.42 
Most of them did not make it pass the mark-up stage, but years of patience and proactive 
rallying of support eventually paid off. In October 1992, the Central Valley Project 
Improvement Act (CVPIA) was signed into law as part of the Reclamations Projects 
Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992.43 The following is a summary by the U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation of the key changes to the CVP through the CVPIA:  
“800,000 acre-feet of water dedicated to fish and wildlife annually; tiered water 
pricing applicable to new and renewed contracts; water transfers provision, 
including sale of water to users outside the CVP service area; special efforts to 
restore anadromous fish population by 2002; restoration fund financed by water 
and power users for habitat restoration and enhancement and water and land 
acquisitions; no new water contracts until fish and wildlife goals achieve; no 
contract renewals until completion of a Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement; terms of contracts reduced from 40 to 25 years with renewal at the 
discretion of the Secretary of the Interior; installation of the temperature control 
device at Shasta Dam; implementation of fish passage measures at Red Bluff 
Diversion Dam; firm water supplies for Central Valley wildlife refuges; and 
development of a plan to increase CVP yield.”44 
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This was the biggest legislative victory for restoring the Delta since the start of its 
reclamation in the mid-1800s; to the relief of many, restoration was finally a top priority. 
Immediately after the CVPIA passed as law, restoration efforts began and the necessary 
water promised in the act was directed to fish and wildlife.45 However, now that 
environmental interests also became a top priority of the Delta, there was instantly 
tension among the many stakeholders—specifically the urban, agricultural, and 
environmental interests of the Bay-Delta. If the amount of water given to habitat 
restoration increased and the amount of water in the Delta remained steady, at best, how 
much less water would urban and agricultural needs receive? This was not a question that 
anyone was about to answer because stakeholders would ideally not have to give up any 
water, despite new allocations to restoration projects.  
 For the two years after the passage of the CVPIA, environmentalists, agricultural 
and urban water users agreed to collaborate and “find common ground” in protecting the 
Bay-Delta, but also ensure sufficient supply to all parties.46 State agencies, officials, 
Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt, and four federal agencies also united to create water 
quality standards and a plan for long-term harmonized use and restoration of the Delta. In 
June 1994, these state and federal groups agreed to collaborate in finding an overall 
solution for the Delta. This marked the formation of the California Water Policy Council 
and Federal Ecosystem Directorate (CALFED), which consisted of state and federal 
agencies along with representatives of all stakeholders. CALFED worked for six months 
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on a proposal that would set standards for water quality and transfers. In December of 
1994, all of these parties came together and signed what is now known as the Bay-Delta 
Accord.47  The water wars appeared to reach a peaceful end. The agreement, enforced 
over the next three years, set varying maximum restrictions on water exports from the 
Delta depending on the time of year, guaranteed a reliable supply of water for the three 
main groups of stakeholders, ensured real time monitoring of water levels, and promised 
to comply with all environmental regulations through restoration efforts.48 The most 
compromising clause in the agreement was the guarantee that all water needs would be 
met without needing additional water from the Delta, but how would this be done?  
“Additional water needs will be provided by the Federal government on a willing 
seller basis financed by Federal funds, not through additional regulatory re-
allocations of water within the Bay-Delta”49 
 
This was a four-year temporary and potentially expensive solution, but the signing of the 
Bay-Delta Accord launched a long-term planning process through the CALFED Bay-
Delta Plan; this was the plan that appeared to be the answer to California’s Water Wars. 
While it was full of good intentions—collaboration, compromise, and complete Delta 
reform—the plan eventually could not meet its overly ambitious goals.  
 
The Rise and Fall of CALFED – Right Intentions, Poor Implementation 
 After the signing of the Bay-Delta Accord in 1994, the numerous50 state and 
federal agencies that comprised of the CALFED group spent the next five years drafting 
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the programmatic plan containing its environmental impact statement and report 
(EIS/EIR).51 During this period, Congress approved the development of the CALFED 
program in 1996 along with $143 million dollars of funding per year for FY1996 to 
FY2000.52 CALFED also released its draft Phase I report that outlines primary programs 
and three possible solutions.53 A preliminary second draft of the report containing Phase 
II was released to the California State Senate in March of 1998.54 For the sake of 
legislative oversight, the California State Senate passed a resolution to create the Senate 
Select Committee on the CALFED Bay-Delta Program in April of 1998.55 In 1999, the 
primary agencies who prepared the report publicly released another draft of the plan and 
opened a three-month period for public comment.56 The CALFED Bay-Delta Program’s 
draft report received thousands of comments, 10,000 of which are impressively addressed 
in a three-volume Response to Comments document.57 The report went back for revision 
and the Final Programmatic EIS/EIR was released in July 2000. The Record of Decision 
for the finalized CALFED Bay-Delta Program was signed in August 2000 and promised 
to be “the largest, most comprehensive water management program in the world.”58 
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Main Topics and Goals of CALFED 
 There were four primary objectives of the CALFED Bay-Delta Program listed in 
its programmatic report and agreed upon in the Record of Decision: water supply 
reliability, water quality, ecosystem restoration, and levee system integrity.59 Other 
interrelated major program elements included governance of the Bay-Delta, watersheds, 
storage, conveyance, an Environmental Water Account, water use efficiency, water 
transfers, and science.60 The program set large goals in each of these objectives 
aggregating to an estimated cost of $10 billion dollars over 30 years of implementation, 
with $8.7 billion needed during the first seven years (Stage 1); CALFED expected 
approximately equal proportions of funding to come from the federal, state, and local 
level.61 The Programmatic Record of Decision elaborates on plans for each objective. The 
CALFED plan’s main mission was to address all of the problems the Delta faced and 
appease all stakeholders, thus explaining the widespread number of goals. The following 
list briefly describes the long-term plan of action for each objective in the order that the 
Programmatic Record of Decision presented them. 
Governance:  establishment of a Federal-State Commission for oversight in 
implementation with members from various state and federal agencies 
Ecosystem Restoration: comprehensive Ecosystem Restoration Program (ERP) 
with over 600 programmatic actions for Bay-Delta that would require $1 billion 
dollars from various funding sources 
Watersheds: implement the CALFED Watershed Program, which would promote 
local watershed management to achieve improved water supply, flood 
management, ecosystem restoration, and water quality 
Water Supply Reliability: improvement of water supply reliability alongside 
restoration efforts would be met by storage, conveyance, and Environmental 
Water Account plans below 
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Storage: expand storage capacity of existing open reservoirs, surface storage 
sites, and groundwater reservoirs at an estimated cost of $1.4 billion with funding 
sources not yet known due to uncertainty and varying plans for projects 
Conveyance: improve existing canals and export facilities from the State Water 
Project at an estimated cost of $1 billion 
Environment Water Account: acquire, store in bank, transfer, sell, and borrow 
380,000 acre-feet of water annually for conveyance purposes to reduce pumping 
and protect the Bay-Delta ecosystem 
Water Use Efficiency: create incentive-based program for water conservation 
and recycling among all stakeholders with a needed initial investment of $1.5 to 2 
billion dollars 
Water Quality: set and achieve healthy water quality standards by investing in 
more treatment and desalination technology; allow users to access clean water 
more easily through delivery and exchange programs; $950 million needed for 
stage one, more than half of which would come from state and federal funding 
and the other half locally 
Water Transfers: implement the CALFED Water Transfer Program, which would 
increase facilities for water transfers and lower transaction costs by streamlining 
permits 
Levees: implement CALFED Levee System Integrity Program to ensure long-term 
protection of the Bay-Delta through maintenance of existing levees and rebuilding 
of broken ones so that salinity in the Delta does not increase and habitats are 
protected 
Science: establishment of the CALFED Science Program in order to ensure 
world-class scientific practices in all elements of the program; initial investment 
of $300 million into the program to recruit science board and panel, fuse existing 
programs with refined evaluation framework and performance measures, and 
produce annual reports62 
 
 
Implementation of CALFED in Its First and Final Seven Years 
 Immediately following the Record of Decision in August 2000, CALFED began 
to implement Stage 1 of the plan. This section outlines by year a summary of what was 
accomplished or in progress according to annual reports from 2001 to 2007.  
 2001. In this first year of implementation, the CALFED Bay-Delta Program 
appeared to be on schedule with $500 million of secured and allocated funds from mostly 
state bond funds. While most programs were on schedule or even exceeding expectations, 
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a few goals had to already be delayed due to a lack of resources. Groundwater storage 
was an example of an objective exceeding implementation expectations, with $74 million 
provided for such projects; however, plans to implement expansion studies on the Shasta 
and Los Vaqueros Reservoir had to be delayed due to a lack of funding.63 
 2002. This year marked a crucial accomplishment in the objective of governance: 
the 30-member Bay-Delta Public Advisory Committee was created. Members came from 
a variety of interest groups to provide oversight and recommendations on the 
implementation of the CALFED plan. Other improvements were made in almost every 
program area, especially state funds-supported projects in restoration, water recycling, 
and groundwater storage. However, the 2002 Annual Report already began to express 
concern over how “lack of state and federal funding [had] impeded progress on” several 
areas like the water management and finance plan. For a program intended to average 
over $1 billion in spending per year, the CALFED was barely meeting half of that 
standard when only $504 million was secured in funding for the next year, 2003.64 
 2003. Another important group was created in 2003: The Bay-Delta Authority. 
While the Bay-Delta Public Advisory Committee served primarily to advise the project 
and consult the public, the Bay-Delta Authority was delegated the task of long-term 
planning, especially in finance, and oversight. The Authority was also charged to report 
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the status of implementation on all areas of the CALFED plan. Progress appeared to have 
slowed because the 2003 report summarized the improvements made over the past three 
years, instead of just the current year like the past reports did. The report admitted that 
“securing reliable state and federal funding continues to be the greatest challenge for the 
Program” and “lack of federal authorization has adversely affected implementation of 
projects in the Water Use Efficiency, Conveyance, and Levee System Integrity 
Programs”. Many of these same areas were way behind schedule “compared to levels 
projected in the Record of Decision”.65 
  2004. Despite severe funding issues between 2001 and 2003, 2004 showed some 
promise. Funding from Proposition 50, a California state bond, was made available to 
support all program objectives, instead of a selected few. President George W. Bush also 
passed legislation that authorized federal agencies to implement CALFED activities and 
allocated $389 million to the program over the next six years. This amount was 
unfortunately still nowhere near enough for CALFED to meet its original goals, but it 
was a significant improvement from the previous years when the program received little 
to no federal funding. By this point, $2.9 billion had been committed to CALFED, which 
contributed to significant strides in levee improvements, watershed projects, and several 
other project objectives. However, most other parts of the plan had been underfunded, 
which suggested the entire plan and its goals would soon need reexamination.66  
 2005. Instead of optimistically beginning its summary of progress like past 
reports, “this year’s Progress Report differ[ed] slightly from previous years in that it 
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recognize[d] that many of the schedules established in the ROD (Record of Decision) 
[had] been substantially delayed.” The report moves on to acknowledge how its 
schedules and goals “were unreasonable at the outset.”  Ridden with previously 
unforeseen problems of inadequate funding and other hurdles, the CALFED Bay-Delta 
Plan had “not realized the progress or desired outcomes expected in each of the four 
CALFED Program objects: levee system integrity, ecosystem restoration, water quality 
and water supply reliability.” Despite the program accomplishing several restoration 
projects and beginning improvements for many areas of the plan, it was time for 
CALFED to become more realistic and less idealistic. The plan could no longer be the 
amazing please-all solution it once promised to be; leaders involved with CALFED soon 
had “to make difficult choices, likely disappointing some constituencies without pleasing 
others” by refocusing the program into Governor Schwarzenegger’s proposed 10-Year 
Action Plan, which was a water financing plan to push CALFED and other water 
programs forward.67 This new 10-Year Action Plan proposed a huge change in the 
governance structure of CALFED, new financing plans for new priorities, creation of a 
focused Delta Vision, and the start of an important new habitat conservation plan.68 
 2006: The 2006 Annual Report displays a shift in tone following the refocused 
10-Year Plan from 2005. Despite slow, continuous progress in some areas of the 
CALFED Plan, the Bay-Delta Authority and Public Advisory Committee acknowledged 
the urgency for revisions of the previous CALFED goals and implementation plans from 
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the Record of Decision. In the conclusion of the report, these authorities published an 
ultimatum that would have to be met by the end of 2007, the end of the seven-year Stage 
1 phase of CALFED. This ultimatum stated that “performance measures must be 
developed and implemented for the four CALFED Program Objectives”, “a more detailed 
evaluation and analysis of CALFED Program progress in relation to the CALFED ROD 
must be prepared”, “ and a revised CALFED implementation schedule must be 
prepared.” If these measures failed to be taken, the CALFED Program would be “out of 
balance by the end of 2007.”69  
 2007 – The Final Report: The final CALFED report released was primarily a 
retrospective look at lessons learned from the seven years in Stage 1, a summary of total 
progress, and a preface to California’s two new priorities—the Delta Vision and the Bay-
Delta Conservation Plan. In the section for thoughts moving forward, the report inferred 
the death of the CALFED Bay-Delta Program by explaining how the demanded 
reevaluation of CALFED in 2007 “allowed for the possibility for changes in programs 
and projects that would best enable the agencies to meet the still-valid CALFED goals”.  
Total spending of approximately $4.2 billion reported for seven years of Stage 1 and the 
initial approximately $500 million of federal funding for CALFED planning amount to a 
grand total of $4.7 billion spent on the CALFED Bay-Delta Plan.70 
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Lessons Learned from CALFED – Delta Stewardship Council Tries Again 
“In general, the CALFED Program has worked well toward meeting its objectives 
during the first seven years, particularly in areas outside the Delta…Progress 
within the Delta has been limited.”71 
 
 Lack of progress in the Bay-Delta was the biggest failure of the misleadingly-
titled CALFED Bay-Delta Program. Progress outside of the Delta is still important, but 
the Delta is the center for creating any real improvements to water reliability, ecosystem 
restoration, and water quality. Thus, the progress made through CALFED was overvalued 
in this statement because the central problem remained unsolved. A number of mistakes 
and a lack of action in implementation led to this disappointment that must be learned 
from and avoided moving forward.  
 First of all, the size and complexity of the project goals and governing entities 
were too much to handle all at one time. With twelve widespread, yet inter-related project 
objectives, the lagging of one project often held back another. As certain projects fell 
behind and funding could not be secured, CALFED established one authority after the 
other to create accountability and oversight over the projects. Although the Bay-Delta 
Authority and Public Advisory Committee were huge assets for comprehensive reporting 
and public accountability, the inclusion of so many interests groups on each council made 
collaboration lengthy and difficult. Envision thirty people broken into groups to keep 
track of twelve projects, each with several sub-projects, and then convening to discuss 
them all together. The breadth of CALFED was simply too much to wield.72 The focus on 
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these big, long-term projects also led to a lack of short-term solutions. When agriculture 
needed increased water exports and environmentalists saw the declining Delta, CALFED 
could not deliver because it was continuously waiting on funding for large-scale 
improvement. Those stakeholders could not wait any longer. Some went “outside the 
CALFED process to seek delivery increases”, while environmentalists turned, “in 
desperation, to the courts” with their lawsuits.73  
 The CALFED plan’s initial lack of foresight was another mistake that resulted 
from the size and complexity problem. The program had so much momentum after the 
signing of the Bay-Delta Accord that the planners had to quickly retreat and write 
between hundreds and thousands of pages, explaining the plan and its environmental 
impacts. However, there was no flexibility in the plan, only pure dates and rigid figures 
of expected funding. When the funding goals could not be met, beginning in the first 
year, the annual reports could only report delays and how the plan hoped for sufficient 
funding the next year. When the Delta suffered pelagic organism decline (POD), the plan 
did not have alternative restoration ideas and had to delayed projects further.74 These 
problems led to a lack of confidence in the program, which explains the minimal federal 
funding received during Stage 1. A lack of funding then led to a shortage in personnel 
and financial leverage for contracting projects.75 CALFED lacked support and a true 
authority to push it forward, until Governor Schwarzenegger re-focused CALFED. That 
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revitalization lead to the death of CALFED, but most importantly to the birth of new 
ideas—the creation of a new plan and vision for the Delta by the Delta Vision Blue 
Ribbon Task Force and an improved habitat restoration plan.76  
  In 2009, the task force established the Delta Stewardship Council, a small seven-
member group to succeed the CALFED Bay-Delta Authority and Program.77 This new 
council vows to learn from the mistakes of CALFED and put forth the Delta Plan, a 
comprehensive management plan to become law when finished. Already, the size and 
complexity of governance is smaller and simpler; the page count of the released fifth 
draft of the plan is a fraction of the page count of the initial CALFED documents; and the 
council released an interim plan to perform early actions while the plan is being 
finalized.78,79 Within the plan is a section requiring conservation and restoration 
provisions, which the Bay-Delta Conservation Plan (BDCP) now serves as after an 
amendment was made to the fifth draft in August 2011 to include the BDCP.80 The next 
chapter will examine the BDCP as a current proposal for addressing water reliability, 
ecosystem restoration, and water quality in the Delta.   
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Chapter 3: The Bay-Delta Conservation Plan 
 In 2006, the California Natural Resources Agency (NRA) convened several 
stakeholders, mainly public water agencies and environmental organizations, to develop 
the comprehensive habitat conservation plan that the 10-Year Action Plan called for; this 
plan soon became known as the Bay-Delta Conservation Plan (BDCP). This group of 
stakeholders formed the BDCP Steering Committee and signed a formal Planning 
Agreement in December 2006, committing to the planning and drafting of the BDCP.1 
The primary goals of the BDCP “are to advance the restoration of the ecological 
functions and productivity in the Delta” by meeting the requirements of laws, such as the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) and California’s Natural Community Conservation 
Planning Act (NCCPA); and to “restore and protect water supplies provided by the SWP 
and CVP.”2 By 2010, a full draft of the plan was ready for evaluation and approval by the 
necessary resource agencies. The Steering Committee continued to refine the plan by 
seeking public participation, so that the California Department of Water Resources could 
be advised when taking on its responsibility of finalizing the plan.3 Since the first draft 
was introduced in 2010, there has been continuous revision to the BDCP. The committee 
released the most current revisions to many sections of the draft on February 29, 2012 
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and then released the remaining sections of the Effects Analysis on April 13, 2012.4 The 
following sections will first provide a summary of the Plan’s goals, objectives, 
implementation methods, funding expectations, and potential impacts; and then present 
current opposition and support for the plan.   
 
Goals and Objectives the BDCP Hopes To Achieve 
 Aside from giving the background of the BDCP’s development, the first chapter 
of the Plan briefly states the planned goals, project objectives, and scope of the BDCP. 
The original planning agreement was signed on the basis of nine preliminary 
conservation objectives:  
1) provide protection for covered species under the Plan and their natural 
communities and ecosystems; 2) preserve the diversity of native fish, wildlife, 
plant, and natural communities in the covered area; 3) preserve and restore 
declining habitats and recover declining species; 4) reduce the need to list 
additional species as threatened or endangered; 5) create species-specific goals 
and objectives; 6) set habitat-specific goals and objectives; 7) implement an 
adaptive management and monitoring program to effectively respond to changing 
Delta conditions; 8) minimize and mitigate the taking of listed species in the 
BDCP; 9) avoid any actions that may jeopardize the continued existence of 
covered species or destroy critical habitat.5 
 
General planning goals stemmed from these objectives during the development process. 
There are eight planning goals of the BDCP:  
1) protect and conserve covered species in the Plan Area; 2) preserve, restore, 
and enhance the natural habitats and ecosystems of these species; 3) allow 
projects that positively impact water supply, water quality, and ecosystem 
restoration to continue under a better regulatory system; 4) implement a means of 
doing the above activities in a manner that complies with all relevant state and 
federal environmental laws; 5) rightfully apply for permits to take these covered 
species for conservation implementation; 6) coordinate a standardized way of 
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mitigating and compensating for activities under the BDCP; 7) implement a less 
costly and more efficient project review process than the typical project-by-
project, species-by-species evaluation; 8) provide a well-supported plan that lays 
out clear expectations and processes of meeting regulations.6  
 
The scope or “Plan Area” of the BDCP contains the entire Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta 
and areas around the Delta in need of conservation measures such as the Suisun Marsh, 
Suisun Bay, and the upper Yolo Bypass.7 In addition, areas covered by the BDCP will 
include any and all habitat lands that are conserved through implementation. Thus, the 
scope of the Plan will be flexible and expanded as needed when implementation begins.  
 
BDCP Conservation Strategy and Measures Within It 
 In order to meet the stated objectives and goals above, the BDCP proposes a 
comprehensive set of measures for restoring the Delta ecosystem, managing species and 
habitats listed in the Plan, improving water supply reliability, and implementing systems 
for mitigation and monitoring of BDCP activities to avoid detrimental effects on the 
Delta.8 The first part of BDCP’s strategy is to implement measures that meet the plan’s 
biological goals of improving the hydrological conditions of the Delta and the ecological 
conditions. The second part of BDCP’s strategy is to meet its water supply goals of 
improving supply and reliability of water diverted from the Delta by the SWP and CVP. 
There are three types of conservation measures that the BDCP presents for implementing 
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these strategies: conveyance and water operations, habitat protection and restoration, and 
other stressors.9  
 The conveyance and water operations conservation measures propose to construct 
new north Delta diversions with added fish screens, to construct a “tunnel/pipeline 
isolated conveyance facility” or better known as a peripheral canal (See Appendix A), 
and to improve conveyance operations of facilities north, south, and through the Delta in 
the near and long term.10 The canal that the BDCP proposes is determined to be the best 
alternative to six other conveyance systems that the Plan evaluates in Chapter 9.11 In 
order to maintain water supply, but also preserve fish habitats, the BDCP also proposes to 
enhance the Yolo Bypass Fisheries by constructing gates on the Fremont Weir that will 
increase floodplain inundation, improve passage and habitat conditions for specific 
species like the Chinook salmon and steelhead, and manage the flow of the bypass.12  
 Habitat protection and restoration conservation measures consist of several 
specific restoration projects, such as the Tidal Habitat Restoration measure, Riparian 
Habitat Restoration, and the Creation of the Preserve System. The Tidal Habitat 
Restoration proposes to restore “65,000 acres of freshwater and brackish tidal habitat.”13 
Riparian Habitat Restoration aims to restore “5,000 acres of riparian forest and scrub 
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within the [other] new floodplain, tidal, and channel margin restorations.”14 The Preserve 
System would protect 8,000 acres of grassland, 300 acres of vernal pool complex, and 
400 acres of alkali in existing natural habitats. It would also “protect and maintain 
wildlife habitat functions of 4,600 acres of rice lands and 12,020 to 28,040 acres of non-
rice agricultural lands.”15 There are a number of measures not listed here, but the overall 
goal is to have specific action plans for restoration as part of a larger vision of restoring 
80,000 acres of habitat over a 50 year period (See Appendix B). 
 The BDCP acknowledges that there are many other stressors on the Delta that 
affect its ecosystem health, the fish, and wildlife. Other Stressors Conservation Measures 
single out the stressors and proposes several solutions to protect habitats and species. For 
example, Methylmercury Management would ensure the management of mercury and 
methylmercury levels in restoration areas.16  Predator Control would reduce predators of 
covered species by “conducting focused predator control in high predator density 
locations.”17 Conservation Hatcheries proposes new programs and the expansion of 
existing programs that promote the conservation for the delta and longfin smelt.18 
 In addition to these three conservation measures, the BDCP has real-time, near-
term, and long-term operational criteria to ensure past mistakes from CALFED are not 
repeated. The short-term criteria are specific restrictions for exports during certain times 
of the year, just as the Bay-Delta Accord previously proposed. Through real-time 
monitoring by relevant agencies, the BDCP will ensure the reduced impact on water 
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supply under practices of adaptive management.19  In the long term, new “operational 
criteria will be implemented once the new conveyance system on the Sacramento River 
becomes operational.”20 
 
Implementation and Funding of the BDCP 
The BDCP has three chapters on implementation; the first presents the schedule 
of implementation; the second presents the structure of implementation; and the third 
presents anticipated costs and expected funding sources.21 Implementation of the BDCP 
is proposed to be done over the 50 years the plan has take authorization permits, while 
many of the conservation measures will be implemented under an adaptive management 
system as soon as possible “following planning, design, and regulatory compliance”.22 
Chapter 6 of the BDCP details the anticipated timing of every proposed measure and 
promises annual progress reports, water operations reports, and concrete budgets.23 In 
addition, the BDCP must be comprehensively reviewed and must prepare an 
implementation plan every five years, so that the plan not only aims for long-term goals, 
but also looks in detailed hindsight and foresight at short-term accomplishments and 
upcoming short-term implementation goals.24 Lastly, the schedule anticipates unforeseen 
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circumstances and has mitigation measures for altering implementation of the BDCP, 
while trying to maintain the original terms of the plan.25 
Chapter 7 of the BDCP clearly lays out the implementation structure of the plan. 
Beginning with the establishment of the BDCP Implementation Office, the BDCP gives 
the office the responsibilities of overseeing non-water operations and ensuring regulatory 
compliance of all plan activities.26 The rest of the chapter details what and how many 
managing personnel will be hired, the exact structure of groups within the 
implementation structure, and the BDCP’s relationship to regulatory agencies and the 
Delta Stewardship Council (See Appendix C).27  
The securing of funding and the elaboration of exact costs are most crucial to 
actual implementation of the BDCP. In 2010, the BDCP estimated that the total 
implementation costs of the plan over 50 years would range between a low estimate of 
$20.9 billion dollars and a high estimate of $24.7 billion dollars (2009 dollars).28 This 
figure excludes financing costs of the project, which could significantly increase this 
estimate range (See Appendix D). The most substantial cost is the conveyance plan of a 
peripheral canal. In the previous draft release of implementation costs on February 29, 
2012, the average estimate cost of the canal’s capital and operation costs increased from 
$14.7 billion in the 2010 estimate to $15.7 billion.29 The average cost has increased 
primarily because the new high cost estimate is much higher than previously expected. It 
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is unknown whether this is due to conservatism in estimating, or if high-estimate 
components of the canal have truly increased. Either way, the canal is the most expensive 
project of the BDCP and must have secured funding sources before implementation.  
Multiple funding sources are expected to finance the BDCP, but many contracts are still 
under discussion. Chapter 8 of the BDCP details the distribution funding sources of the 
estimated $23.6 billion dollars needed (See Appendix F). 73% is expected to come from 
State and Federal Water Contractors, all of whom have “committed to fully fund all 
construction and related mitigation costs for implementation” of the conveyance 
projects.30 The remaining 27% is expected to come from state and federal government 
funding, much of which is still in negotiation or not secured. Approximately 11% of 
BDCP funding is hoping to come from the New Water Bond initiative that will be on the 
November 2012 ballot, but the approval of that is uncertain.31 
 
Anticipated Impacts of the BDCP 
 The Effects Analysis portion of the BDCP was the last to be released and is 
currently under a two-phase independent scientific review. During Phase I in 2011, the 
Independent Science Review Panel (panel) evaluated the first set of draft appendices 
from the Effects Analysis: Conceptual Foundation and Analytical Framework of the 
effects analysis; and the Entrainment Appendix.32 The panel provided a series of 
recommendations for the BDCP to move forward with when preparing the actual Effects 
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Analysis section. The panel felt that the goals of the Effects of Analysis had not been 
clearly defined or well-organized within the Framework.33 One of the most important 
recommendations the panel made was that “analyses of the individual actions need to be 
scaled to an integrative analysis that includes all relevant conservation measures of the 19 
possible [now 22].”34 The preparers of the Effects Analyses took these recommendations 
very seriously and finally released a draft in February 2012, which is now being 
evaluated through Phase II. The independent review should be released in June 2012.35 
The draft accomplished individual action analysis on individual species and habitats as 
recommended by the Panel. The Effects Analysis draft is also well-organized, despite its 
length.  
In summary of the released Effects Analysis findings, net effects on specific 
species and habitats range from negative to positive. For nearly every species and habitat, 
there are both beneficial and adverse effects resulting from the BDCP. Using covered 
bird species as a brief example from Chapter 5, Section 5.1 (See Appendix G): several 
conservation measures produce an even net effect of both beneficial and adverse effects 
on bird species.36 However, the CM1 Water Facilities and Operation, or the conveyance 
canal project, produces only negative effects on the covered bird species; whereas CM22 
Avoidance and Minimization Measures produce only beneficial effects to these bird 
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species; these trends are true for all other tables for other species in the rest of the Effects 
Analyses.37  
Given these potential impacts, especially from the peripheral canal, a lot of public 
attention has been given to the BDCP in the recent year. Reactions to the plan are mixed, 
with heavy support for the conservation and water reliability ideals of BDCP and great 
opposition towards the peripheral canal.  
 
Criticism and Support for the BDCP 
Critics of the BDCP are mostly perturbed by the re-emergence of the peripheral 
canal project and the environmental risks associated with the construction of it. Tina 
Swanson, Director of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) Science Center in 
San Francisco, published a post on the BDCP on April 17, 2012, just after the April 13th 
release of the Effects Analyses. She notes that “according to its own ‘effects analysis,’ 
[the plan] would make the existing situation worse by further degrading estuarine habitat, 
harming most of the fish species it is supposed to help and increasing water diversions 
from this already over-tapped system.”38 The Environmental Water Caucus (EWC) 
echoed the same concern just a day before on April 16, when it mailed a letter to the 
California Natural Resources Agency. After beginning review of the Effects Analysis, the 
EWC found a number of the findings in the analysis alarming and proceeded to list ten 
observed problems with the BDCP.39 The most notable points highlight the BDCP’s:  
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(1) “lack of specific, measurable, and achievable objectives that define the BDCP 
contribution to the recovery of covered species and the conservation of natural 
communities in the Delta. There are currently no goals to recover populations of 
endangered fish in the Delta, only for avoiding jeopardy”; (2) “failure to align 
with the state’s objective in reducing reliance on the Delta”; (3) “absence of a 
full range of alternatives, including an alternative which would reduce exports 
from the Delta.”40 
 
Another point notes that the board members overseeing implementation of the BDCP are 
primarily water export contractors, who have good reason to ignore the reduced water 
exports alternative.41 These are the same water contractors funding 73% of the BDCP.  
In a balanced “head to head” editorial on the Sacramento Bee, Pia Lopez and Ben 
Boychuk answer the important question: “Should California build a Delta water canal it 
rejected in the 1980s?”42 Pia Lopez answered ‘No’, just as environmentalists like Tina 
Swanson and groups within the EWC would answer. She begins by encouraging 
everyone to “not obscure what this is all about. California’s post-World War II plumbing 
system” serves to export “Northern California water to dry Southern California cities and 
farms” through the State Water Project and the Central Valley Project.43 She sees this 
canal as a way to please Southern California and “San Joaquin Valley’s arid west side.”44 
Southern California would not propose spending billions of dollars on a project just to 
maintain current levels of water exports; “they want to maximize water exports south of 
the Delta. More water, not just ‘reliable’ water.”45 The solution should not be about 
constructing another water project that forces water to flow backwards. California “ought 
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to be talking seriously about how to reduce Southern California dependence on Delta 
water” through better efforts of conservation and water recycling. Pia Lopez ends by 
noting that Southern California “may never get to ‘Delta-free self-reliance’” because of 
the large population, but better measures can be taken than more diversions from the 
North to the South.46 Ben Boychuk disagrees and makes his case from Pia Lopez’s 
ending point about never-ending reliance on the Delta. 
Despite agreeing with Lopez on how the peripheral canal “is a rat’s nest of 
politics and special interests” and the ecological and economic uncertainty of it, Ben 
Boychuk still thinks California “should build it anyway.”47 Southern California requires 
“80 percent of all water consumed statewide”, but Boychuk does not expect conservation 
to ease the demand. Based on a 2009 mandated “20 percent cut in consumption”, but the 
improvement in water supply was minimal because “farmers use 80 percent of all water 
consumed statewide”.48 Despite environmentalists desire “to thwart the peripheral canal”, 
Boychuk argues that the southern cities “need water to live” and unfortunately “you can’t 
drink good intentions” of protecting the environment.49 Essentially, Boychuk sees how 
the special interest and favor for a peripheral canal skews priorities of restoration, but he 
realistically admits this is the best option for now because the south needs water. 
Southern California will undoubtedly support the BDCP and demand water “as long as 
California remains one state.”50  
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Supporters of the BDCP have the same realistic views on water demand in 
California as Boychuk. The Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) recently released 
a report entitled “California 2025: Planning for a Better Future” and addresses the state of 
water in California in a section of the report. The first statement the report makes on 
water is how “instability in the Delta” is “California’s biggest water challenge.”51 The 
report argues that “a peripheral canal is the best approach for addressing both ecosystem 
and economic risks” because it is better than the current system of pumping and produces 
better water quality and water supply reliability.52 A dual system of a canal and continued 
pumping is feasible in the short-term, but pumping must be eliminated in the long term 
because of levee failures and sea level rise that increase salinity in the Delta.53 In 2008 
University of the Pacific Business Forecasting report, a peripheral canal is compared to 
the often ignored alternative of ending Delta water exports. The report concludes that 
ending exports would be too costly, due to the increased need for conservation systems, 
water recycling, and desalination, which are much more expensive sources of water.54                                                                                                                             
U.S. Leaders also support the BDCP. Governor Jerry Brown advocated for the 
Plan to begin implementation by the end of 2012 in his State of the State address, 22 
years after he signed a previous peripheral canal project into law.55 President Obama and 
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the Department of Interior have also supported the BDCP since December 2010.56 These 
leaders support the BDCP for the same reasons the PPIC listed, but also support it from a 
place of political and legislative experience. The BDCP is a huge improvement from 
CALFED, as intended, to change the status quo of Delta exports. There are ecological 
risks associated with keeping both the current pumping system and shifting to a 
peripheral canal, but the canal is the one system that California has not tried, despite the 
previous two times it nearly became an authorized project.  
 
Analytical Conclusions about the BDCP 
 While the BDCP is clearly a better approach to resolving the Delta problems than 
CALFED was, it is still far from being the balanced solution the declining Delta needs. 
The argument that the construction of a peripheral canal would be better than the 
pumping system currently place is valid. To some extent, some action would be better 
than no action. However, the most disappointing part of the BDCP is its name; if this is 
conservation plan, why do the project’s costs and needs not reflect that? The peripheral 
canal makes up more than a majority of the project’s costs. Despite the proposed export 
restrictions in the BDCP, there are times of the year that more water would be allowed to 
be exported than current exporting standards. This explains why environmentalists are 
waving their arms in panic; this plan does not appear to be conserving any water. While it 
is impossible to measure total potential net effects of the plan on the Delta, the potential 
increased exports to a growing Southern California is likely to even out the amount of 
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habitat the Plan proposes to restore and protect. The EWC may only represent one group 
of stakeholders, but its letter to the California Natural Resources Agency raised very 
valid concerns over the Plan. First of all, the lack of real standards for restoration was 
disappointing. Despite its valuable acreage goals for restoration, those efforts would be 
futile if the population of certain species still decline. The BDCP needs to adopt better 
standards of conservation if it has any hopes of truly elongating the life of the Bay-Delta, 
while maintaining long-term water supply for all of California. Next, reducing water 
exports is an alternative that should have been worthy of the BDCP’s evaluation in 
Chapter 9, its assessment of conservation methods to “reduce the amount of ‘take’ or 
increase the level of conservation of listed species.”57 Even if the costs would be very 
high, the neutrality of the Plan comes into question because reducing water exports was 
not even addressed, giving environmentalists more reason to oppose the plan.  
   Overall, the BDCP needs more revision of its content in order to be a viable 
solution for the Delta. As it stands, the actual conservation efforts do not seem enough to 
assure California that the Delta’s ecosystem is safe from continuing decline. The 
peripheral canal is a promising alternative to current pumping systems, but may not be 
feasible in the long-term given Southern California’s growth. Perhaps the canal should be 
planned for a shorter-term and efforts that can even slightly wean Southern California off 
of Delta water should be doubled. The main concern is that the BDCP needs to 
demonstrate a more balanced approach, in line with its planned goals and objectives, so 
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that more people will support the plan. However, with continuing warfare over water in 
California, this surely will prove to be the BDCP’s hardest task.
  
Chapter 4: H.R. 1837 – The Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley Water Reliability Act 
 After a devastating drought in California between 2007 and 2009, three 
Congressman serving districts in the Central Valley—Rep. Devin Nunes (CA-21), Rep. 
Kevin McCarthy (CA-22), and Rep. Jeff Denham (CA-19)—came together to draft a bill 
that would no longer allow their counties to receive less-than-promised water deliveries. 
The likely suspects that caused water allocations to reach as low as 10% in parts of the 
Central Valley could only be the “draconian regulations” that “divert water from farms to 
a three inch fish – the Delta smelt.”1  
 The Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley Water Reliability Act (H.R. 1837) promises 
to “promote water policies that facilitate the delivery of California’s abundant supply of 
water, as well as support the implementation of an economically feasible and 
environmentally sustainable river restoration on the San Joaquin River.”2 It was first 
introduced in the House of Representatives on May 11, 2011 and finally passed in the 
House on February 29, 2012.3 It has now been put on the U.S. Senate Legislative 
Calendar for discussion and voting, with the date still yet to be announced. There are five 
titles to the bill:  
Title I – Central Valley Project Water Reliability 
Title II – San Joaquin River Restoration 
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Title III – Repayment Contracts and Acceleration of Repayment of Construction 
Costs 
Title IV – Bay-Delta Watershed Water Rights Preservation and Protection 
Title V – Miscellaneous4  
 
Title I and II are the major parts of this bill because it proposes significant amendments to 
the Central Valley Project Reliability Act (CVPIA) and repeals precedent set by the San 
Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act (SJRRSA) in favor of a simpler law for general 
restoration of the San Joaquin River.5 The following sections will summarize the key 
amendments to these laws and key proposals of H.R. 1837; discuss potential costs and 
impacts; and present current support and opposition to the bill.  
 
Title I – Amending the CVPIA 
 H.R. 1837 proposes to fundamentally change the purpose of the CVPIA, which 
currently prioritizes the protection, restoration, and enhancement of “fish, wildlife, and 
associated habitats in the Central Valley and Trinity River basins of California” by 
setting aside 800,000 acre-feet of water for restoration.6 This bill adds a greater priority, 
requiring this title “to facilitate and expedite water transfers in accordance with this Act” 
and “ensure that water dedicated to fish and wildlife purposes by this title [the 800,000 
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acre-feet] is replaced and provided to Central Valley Project water contractors by 
December 31, 2016, at the lowest cost reasonable achievable.”7  
 Defining “reasonable” and “anadromous”. The next section defines the word 
“reasonable flows”, which is a phrase added to many parts of the bill. “The term 
‘reasonable flows’ means water flows capable of being maintained taking into account 
competing consumptive uses of water and economic, environmental, and social factors”; 
this added line to the CVPIA gives equal weight to the different types of water uses, 
whereas environmental uses previously served as the top priority.8 The term “anadromous 
fish” previously included all “stocks of salmon (including steelhead) striped bass, 
sturgeon, and American shad.”9 H.R. 1837 limits this definition to native fish and 
removes the non-native striped bass and American shad from the list.10  
 Contracts. Previously the “Limitation on Contracting and Contract Reform” 
section, H.R. 1837 changes the section title to simply “Contracts” and eliminates 
everything that was previously in the section. Simplified into two clauses, the bill amends 
the renewal duration of contracts back to 40 years from 25 years listed in the CVPIA; and 
“retains the existing CVPIA provision requiring that contracts shall include a provision to 
charge the contractor only for water actually delivered.”11 The previous version of this 
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section had elaborate rules requiring new contract applicants to first meet certain 
environmental criteria, but H.R. 1837 eliminates all of those rules.  
 Water Transfers, Management, and Conservation. The fourth section of H.R. 
1837 amends the CVPIA’s laws on water transfers in four ways. First, the bill adds 
language requiring the Secretary of the Interior to “take all necessary actions to facilitate 
and expedite transfers of Central Valley Project water” and to determine within 45 days if 
a water transfer proposal is complete; if not complete, the Secretary must inform the 
contractor what is needed for completion within that time frame.12 This portion also no 
longer allows the Secretary to advise or impose other requirements on a transfer; the 
contractor retains full authority over the proposed transfer.13 The second amendment the 
bill introduces over water transfers allows transfers to occur that could have occurred 
before the CVPIA was enacted. These previous water transfers were allegedly easier 
before the CVPIA enacted restrictions.14 The next amendment eliminates the use of the 
word “metering” and replaces it with “measurement” to expand the number of ways 
water use could be measured beyond solely metering.15 This section also loosens the 
extent to which measurements need to be done. If a contracting district’s surface water is 
“commingled with other water supplies”, it does not have to measure water use. Lastly, 
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H.R. 1837 eliminates the tiered-pricing of water, which previously raised extra revenue 
for the Restoration Fund. 16  
 Fish, Wildlife, and Habitat Restoration. H.R. 1837 amends this portion of the 
CVPIA to only provide “reasonable flows” for anadromous fish restoration. The previous 
800,000 acre-feet minimum reserved for fish and wildlife, is now “a ceiling, rather than a 
floor, on the amount of water that can be taken from farmers and reallocated to the 
environment.17 The Secretary is directed, under H.R. 1837, to divert “any part of the 
800,000 acre-feet to Agriculture or Municipal and Industrial purposes” after a reasonable 
amount of water has been directed to fish and wildlife.18 The 800,000 acre-feet will also 
serve to keep water allocations at 75% for Delta users, thus also prioritizing the needs of 
agriculture and urban water users. H.R. 1837 adds an extra section clarifying that the 
Secretary’s pursuit, not the achievement of certain standards, of fish, wildlife, and habitat 
restoration would be suffice in meeting protection and other mitigation goals of the 
CVPIA’s restoration priorities.19 
 The Restoration Fund.  The proposed bill amends this section by lifting the 
requirement that 67% of monies in the Restoration Fund must only be used for habitat 
restoring activities; all funds in for restoration can instead be used for any action item 
necessitated by the CVPIA.20 An appended section also prohibits the Secretary from 
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soliciting direct and indirect contributions to the Restoration Fund; this essentially means 
that most of the money in the fund must come from excess revenues, which H.R. 1837 
also reduces by cutting the total amount that the fund can receive in payments from $30 
million to $15 million by December 31, 2020.21 Finally, the bill establishes a Restoration 
Fund Advisory Board to oversee the finances of CVPIA activities and the compilation of 
a report that must be submitted to Congress annually; this board consists of “four CVP 
agricultural users, three CVP municipal and industrial users, three CVP power 
contractors, and two at the discretion of the Secretary.”22  
 Additional Authorities. Regarding additional contracts for storage and delivery 
of water from non-CVP sources, H.R. 1837 federally authorizes the Secretary to “deliver 
nonproject water using Central Valley Project facilities for any beneficial purpose” and 
does not allow payments from transferred water to go into the Restoration Fund.23 The 
bill also strikes “non-profit” from in between “private” and “organizations”, “thereby 
expanding the authority of the Secretary to enter into conveyance, storage and similar 
contracts with all private entities.”24 H.R. 1837 also reduces the time the Secretary has to 
“develop a plan to increase (by no later than the year 2016) the yield of the CVP to 
replace the ‘upfront’ water reallocated by the CVPIA for fish and wildlife purposes”, 
meaning any water diverted for fish and wildlife must be proportionately replaced to the 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/content/files/2012-02-
28_DOC_ComparisonHR1837_CVPIA.pdf (accessed April 22, 2012). 
21
 Ibid.  
22
 "Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley Water Reliability Act - Section-by-Section," Congressman Devin 
Nunes | 21st District of California, http://nunes.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Section-by-
Section_of_the_Sacramento-San_Joaquin_Valley_Water_Reliability_Act.pdf (accessed April 22, 2012).  
23
 "H.R. 1837, An Act - 112th Congress, 2nd Session," U.S. Government Printing Office, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1837eh/pdf/BILLS-112hr1837eh.pdf (accessed April 22, 
2012).  
24
 Ibid. 
50 
 
CVP.25 If this replacement cannot occur, then the water allocated to the environment 
must also be suspended.26 The last amendment in this section “authorizes the construction 
of [additional storage] projects if non-federal funds are used.”27 
 New Sections 108-111. The final four sections of Title I make substantial 
additions to the CVPIA. Section 108 revives the Bay-Delta Accord and the agreement’s 
1994 water quality standards and guarantee that supply would not be reduced, despite 
diversions to habitats. This change allows operations in line with the Accord to “proceed 
without regard to the Endangered Species Act of 1973 or any other law pertaining to the 
operation of the Central Valley Project and the California State Water Project.”28  
 Section 109 mandates that the Secretary of Interior and the Secretary of 
Commerce “shall not distinguish between natural-spawned and hatchery-spawned or 
otherwise artificially propagated strains of a species in making any determination under 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA).”29 This section would increase the number of 
fish by including artificially spawned fish into the count, so that the ESA is less 
restrictive on the revised CVPIA goals of expedient and reliable water deliveries to Delta 
users. Section 110 expands the service area of the Central Valley Project to “include the 
area within the boundaries of the Kettleman City Community Services District, 
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California.”30 Lastly, Section 111 proposes the regulatory streamlining of applying for 
permits. The filing of a Notice for Determination or Exemption for any activity of the 
CVP would allow that activity to “be deemed to meet the requirements of Section 
102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969.”31 
 
Title II – Repealing and Replacing the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act  
 Title II of H.R. 1837 proposes to repeal the SJRRSA (Title X of the Omnibus 
Public Land Management Act of 2009), which was a directive to implement the two 
primary goals reached in the settlement in the case, Natural Resources Defense Council, 
et al. v. Kirk Rodgers, et al., which was settled in October 2006.32 These were the two 
summarized goals: 
(1) The Restoration Goal - “to restore and maintain fish populations in ‘good 
condition’ in the main stem of the San Joaquin River below Friant Dam to the 
confluence of the Merced River, including naturally reproducing and self-
sustaining populations of salmon and other fish”; (2) The Water Management 
Goal – “to reduce or avoid adverse water supply impacts to all of the Friant 
Division long-term contractors that may result from the Interim Flows and 
Restoration Flows provided for in the Settlement.”33 
 
H.R. 1837 repeals all terms and these goals pertaining to the settlement within the 
SJRRSA, thereby “terminating salmon restoration activities on the San Joaquin River, 
and instead establishes the San Joaquin Habitat Restoration program.”34 The Secretary is 
prohibited from implementing any aspect of the settlement and is required instead by 
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H.R. 1837 to enforce different restoration goals beginning in March 2013, if enacted into 
law. The bill declares that restoration flows must be released to Friant Dam “every year 
except a ‘Critical Water Year’ in a manner that improves the fishery in the San Joaquin 
River between Friant Dam and Gravelly Ford” to maintain a minimum flow of 50 cubic-
feet per second at the bottom of Friant Dam.35 A critical water year occurs “when total 
unimpaired runoff at Friant Dam is less than 400,000 acre feet” between March 1st and 
the last day of February each year.36  As part of mitigating potential impacts from 
restoration flows, the bill proposes to amend the existing law so that the Secretary is 
required to identify potential impacts of restoration flows on downstream landowners, 
who may receive less water.37 Title IV of H.R. 1837 also declares that it “preempts and 
supersedes and State law, regulation, or requirement that imposes more restrictive 
requirements or regulations on the activities authorized under this title.”38 The bill 
continues to repeal most parts of SJRRSA by placing “limitations on contributions”, 
eliminating $50 million dollars in previous funding for the settlement, and striking the 
remaining “$250 million in authorized funding” for salmon restoration and water 
management.39 
 
 
 
                                                     
35
 "Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley Water Reliability Act - Section-by-Section," Congressman Devin 
Nunes | 21st District of California, http://nunes.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Section-by-
Section_of_the_Sacramento-San_Joaquin_Valley_Water_Reliability_Act.pdf (accessed April 22, 2012).  
36
 "Summary: H.R. 1837 - The San Joaquin Valley Water Reliability Act," California Water Commission, 
https://cwc.ca.gov/Documents/2011/07_July/Agenda_Item_5_Bill%20Analyses.pdf (accessed April 22, 
2012). 
37
 "Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley Water Reliability Act - Section-by-Section." 
38
 Ibid.  
39
 Ibid.  
53 
 
Title III-V: Repayments, Protection of Water Rights, and Miscellaneous 
 The remaining three titles of H.R. 1837 are brief and establish new policies 
regarding repayment of contracts’ construction costs, Bay-Delta Watershed water rights 
protection, and the supremacy of this potential Federal law over state laws. Title III 
“directs the Secretary, upon the request of a contractor, to convert all long-term Central 
Valley Project contracts “from repayment contracts that charge annual installments not 
alter by the actual amount of water delivered, to water service contracts that charges “a 
combined capital and operation and maintenance charge” for each acre-foot of water 
delivered.40 The rest of Title III presents policies to expedite when contractors repay 
loans from the federal government for construction projects.41 Title IV directs the 
Secretary to honor water rights laws and area-of-origin protections; it “ensures that the 
Endangered Species Act is implemented in a manner that honors the priorities delineated 
above” of protects water rights, first and foremost.42 The next section of Title IV applies 
this same prioritizing principle to Sacramento River Settlement Contracts and then 
specifies in the section after that the minimum allocations “agricultural water service 
contractors within the Sacramento River Watershed” are to receive in any type of water 
year.43 These contractors are to receive “not less than 100% of their contract quantities in 
a ‘Wet’, ‘Above Normal’, and ‘Below Normal’ water year; Not less than 75% of their 
contract quantities in a ‘Dry’ water year; and, not less than 50% of their contract 
quantities in a ‘Critically Dry’ water year.”44 Title V, entitled “Miscellaneous” is a brief 
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precedent section establishing “Federal supremacy to protect existing water rights” over 
state laws in coordinated operations of the CVP and SWP; it further clarifies that this 
establishment of law would be “unique to California and the Act shall not serve as a 
precedent in any other state.45 
 
Estimated Impacts of H.R. 183746 
 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) prepared a cost estimate of H.R. 1837 
and released it on February 27, 2012, just days before the bill’s passage in the House. It 
estimates that Title I will “result in additional offsetting receipts of $1 million annually 
because water use would increase.” Offsetting receipts are payments to the government 
that serve to reduce cost budgets of certain authorities, but are not considered revenues.47 
Water transfers and use are expected to increase as a result of loosened environmental 
regulation, but no other costs are expected with Title I despite the shifting of regulations.  
 Funds originally authorized for the SJRRSA will be removed by Title II of H.R. 
1837, providing an expected savings of $300 million dollars over the 2013-2022 period 
(See Appendix H). The SJRRSA previously required the restoration of approximately 
153 miles in the San Joaquin River; Title II reduces that to 65 miles and maintains a 
minimum standard for flows.  
 Title III would expedite the repayment of capital investment by CVP customers. 
CBO estimates that the government will receive a total of $244 million over the 2013-
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2022 period in accelerated payments. Because many of these payments will be subject to 
federal taxing, the CBO Joint Committee on Taxation estimates a revenue loss of $33 
million over the same period (See Appendix H).  
 Lastly, the CBO estimates there will be impacts on state, local, and tribal 
governments that will not exceed the annual threshold of $73 million dollars defined in 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). These impacts come from the mandates 
set forth in H.R. 1837 that preempt state laws and require changes in activities pertaining 
to water management and wildlife restoration. The exact effects of these impacts could 
not be estimated and the CBO specifies that “the legislation contains no private-sector 
mandates.”48 Given the monetary savings, yet stripped environmental regulations of this 
bill, there is both extreme support and opposition to H.R. 1837.  
 
Support and Opposition to H.R. 1837 – Division in Politics and Among Stakeholders 
 Since its introduction to the Natural Resources Committee, H.R. 1837 has been 
highly contentious on Capitol Hill. The sponsors, Rep. Nunes, McCarthy, and Denham, 
are all Republicans of districts in the Central Valley with big agricultural operations, such 
as Kern and Fresno County. On the Democrat side promoting environmental values and 
restoration, Rep. Grace Napolitano and Rep. Edward Markey serve as ranking members 
of the Subcommittee on Water and Power and Natural Resources Committee, 
respectively.49 These two sides have argued incessantly over the bill since its release in 
May 2011.  
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 Congressman Nunes released a revised version of his report, “Distorted Water”, 
in 2012 to present his arguments for why H.R. 1837 should be passed. He attempts to 
counter 20 water myths with facts, none of which are supported with sources. However, 
one apparent fact supporting H.R. 1837 is that despite restoration efforts since 1992, 
salmon populations have still dramatically declined (See Appendix I). Nunes argues that 
his bill “recovers the lost water that was dedicated to a failed $1 billion salmon 
restoration plan” and “reduces the debt” of the country through the repeal of the SJRRSA 
and the accelerated capital repayment system.50 Much of his fury stems from the “10% 
water allocation to people south of the Delta” in his district in 2009, so H.R. 1837 vows 
to equilibrate water received by all stakeholders by bringing priorities for restoration, 
agriculture, and urban usage onto the same level.51  
 The Democrats later released their own report, “Cutting Off the Headwaters”, to 
counter Distorted Water with overwhelming number of excerpts of opposition to the bill 
from various groups. Despite H.R. 1837’s supposed acknowledgement of water rights 
laws and area-of-origin rights, Rep. John Garamendi received confirmation during a June 
13, 2011 hearing that “this bill, in its present form, would remove [certain counties’] 
rights and substitute federal law.”52 The remainder of the report continues to highlight 
testimonies of important people, such as Secretary of Interior Ken Salazar, California 
U.S. Senators Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer, and several leaders from fisheries and 
                                                     
50
 Nunes, Devin, "Distorted Water 2012." Congressman Devin Nunes | 21st District of California, 
http://nunes.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Distorted_Water_2012g.pdf (accessed April 22, 2012). 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 "Cutting Off the Headwaters - Analysis of H.R. 1837, the San Joaquin Valley Water Uncertainty Act," 
U.S. House of Representatives - Natural Resources Committee – Democrats, 
http://democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/sites/democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/files/content/files/
2012-02-16_RPT_HeadwatersReport.pdf (accessed April 22, 2012). 
57 
 
fish-related agencies.53 A commonly echoed message against H.R. 1837 in the report is 
how the bill would run “contrary to the long established tradition of Congressional and 
court deference to states on water resource decisions”, even if the bill specifies in Title V 
that this form of federal supremacy is not to become a precedent.54 Alongside this hostile 
debate on Capitol Hill, California stakeholders have also given strong responses to the 
bill. 
 Nunes released a list of supporters for H.R. 1837 in 2012, which can be compared 
to the list of opposition to the bill that is on the “Cutting Off the Headwaters” report. 
Organizations in support of H.R. 1837 are comprised of mainly water agencies who serve 
the part of the Delta that the bill is promising more water to, state elected leaders who are 
primarily Republican or serve districts south of the Delta, cities that the bill would 
automatically benefit, and national farm organizations and business organizations who 
would benefit from a streamlined process for obtaining water.55 Organizations in 
opposition to the bill are primarily states with several fishing groups, elected officials 
who are either Democrats or serve parts of the Delta where restoration is more valued 
than increased water supply, newspapers with perceived liberal leaning, water districts 
not benefiting from the bill, environmental groups and fishing groups concerned with the 
bill’s removal of restoration waters, and a few business groups also not from south of the 
Delta.56 Most of these organizations have already written letters to Congress expressing 
their position, but the bill remains in deadlock because agriculture and cities south of the 
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Delta are in favor of the bill, while all other stakeholders (environmental and additional 
urban users) see the benefit of this bill being reaped only by a few.  
 
Analytical Conclusions about H.R. 1837 
 Despite H.R. 1837’s proposal to address several valid problems with the Bay-
Delta,  the bill produces greater problems politically and legally because it is  
inappropriately a piece of federal legislation intended to place mandates on an area where 
state and local laws should prevail. This desperate water grab from fish and wildlife 
restoration negates the few portions of the bill that do propose constructive improvements 
for the Delta. Even though advocates for the Delta ecosystem are opposed to leveling the 
priority of fish and wildlife with agricultural needs, H.R. 1837 raises an important 
objection, by making these priorities equal, to the amount of attention restoration has 
received in recent years. Yes, the Delta certainly needs restoration if California intends to 
keep using its water; however, it is disconcerting that increased water flows and efforts to 
restore the Delta do not seem to have yielded any improvements. H.R. 1837 does not 
approach this objection in an acceptable or negotiable way. The bill goes a step too far in 
drastically striking clauses right and left out of the CVPIA and appending policies that 
would allow this bill to supersede landmark environmental regulations, like the 
Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. The extremity of 
these proposed policies make negotiation and compromise near-impossible, when the 
Democrats feel that decades of work for the environment are being erased. South-of-the-
Delta users are understandably frustrated with their water situation and long for days 
before the 1987 drought and the CVPIA when acquiring enough water for their arid land 
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was not a problem. They want the equal share of water they were promised in the Bay-
Delta Accord and refuse to see that times have changed.  This bill is too fixated on 
restoring sufficient flows to agriculture and therefore potentially short-sighted when it 
comes to ensuring the longevity of the Delta. The streamlined processes and simplified 
standards of H.R. 1837 may not be maintainable in the long-run, such as mandating the 
minimum percentage of water that contracts must receive. These proposed changes are no 
better than the same existing environmental restrictions that the sponsors of this bill are 
aiming to change. 
 Another major concern with H.R. 1837 is the bill’s lack of scientific backing. No 
information could be found on the potential effects of reducing flows to habitat and 
increasing water exports. Nunes claims in “Distorted Water” that the bill “replaces junk-
science with sound science”, but does not give proof to support that statement.57 While it 
has yet to be fully determined if increased Delta-pumping directly correlates to decline in 
fish populations,58 it is common sense that taking water away from a fish will harm it. 
Nunes does not address the question of how fish will be affected by the shifting of their 
current water allocation to water users in the Delta.  
 H.R. 1837 claims that its primary goals are to create a water supply that is more 
reliable and “meaningful cooperation among stakeholders”, but minor amendments 
demonstrate its underlying interest in favoring certain Delta users.59 As one example, the 
bill proposes the establishment of a Restoration Fund Advisory Board. The sponsors of 
H.R. 1837 only mandated that the board have agricultural, municipal, industrial, and 
                                                     
57
 “Distorted Water”. 
58
 Ibid. Graph entitled “Delta Inflow and Correlating Salmon Population” shows the lack of correlation 
59
 Ibid. 
60 
 
water contractor groups represented plus “two at the discretion of the Secretary.”60 This is 
a bad and blatant attempt to leave out environmental, fishing, and tribal stakeholders. 
Though the Secretary has a choice of two members, there is no guarantee that these 
groups will be represented if the bill becomes enacted. This underlying notion that H.R. 
1837 is intended to benefit just a small portion of Delta users takes away the credibility of 
the plan as a federal bill. 
 For the reasons previously listed, H.R. 1837 is not a productive solution to 
shortages and problems in the Bay-Delta. The political nature of the bill has kept 
Congress from having any real discussions about real solutions. They just keep shifting 
water from one group to another. While sponsors of H.R. 1837 have their political 
motivations, opponents to H.R. 1837 have also done nothing to contribute constructively 
to this water debate. The fundamental split in the two parties’ views on the environment 
prevents any change from happening in the Delta. The two parties must put many of their 
differences aside and come forth with a truly bipartisan proposal, not the current 
definition of “bipartisan” where a mere few vote with the other party. The war over the 
Delta has only gotten worse from the introduction of this bill, but there is uncertainty in 
how much longer these battles can continue. 
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Chapter 5: Is the Water War Over Yet?  
 The previous sections on the Bay-Delta Conservation Plan (BDCP) and H.R. 
1837, the Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley Water Reliability Act, served to explain and 
show two of the most widely recognized and realistically considered proposals for 
addressing problems in the Delta. When compared together, there are positive aspects the 
two plans share, negative aspects that they share, and aspects where they completely 
differ. This paper has already determined both to be unfit plans for resolving the Delta in 
the long-run, so this comparison will serve to answer why this is true. Upon examining 
the CALFED, BDCP, and H.R. 1837, how are these elaborate proposals still unable to fix 
the Delta? Can the Delta even be fixed? Delta experts have formulated answers to these 
questions, which will be presented in this section.   
 
 BDCP vs. H.R. 1837: Who will win?  
 These two plans are competing proposals, especially because the BDCP is a state-
developed plan and H.R. 1837 is federally-developed. As already established, H.R. 1837 
proposes to supersede state laws, so is it possible for these two proposals to co-exist? 
Kate Poole, Senior Attorney at the Natural Resources Defense Council office in San 
Francisco, published a post expressing how the passage of H.R. 1837 would cause the 
death of the BDCP.1 First and foremost, a federally mandated law like H.R. 1837 could 
override anything established by the BDCP, especially because the two proposals actually 
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differ greatly. H.R. 1837 proposes loosening of federal and state environmental 
regulations; it also focuses on expediting water transfers out of the Delta to agricultural 
users and away from fish and wildlife habitats. BDCP’s biggest component is the 
construction of a peripheral canal in compliance with federal and state environmental 
regulations; increased habitat restoration is the BDCP’s other primary goal. The BDCP 
increases spending on restoration and water exports; H.R. 1837 decreases spending on 
restoration and is estimated to generate increased revenues through expedited water 
transfers.2 Financially, the two are already very different. Poole argues that H.R. 1837 
would have a “destructive effect” on BDCP’s “consensus-based efforts to improve 
California’s water system” and “make authorizing a new peripheral canal impossible.”3 
Devin Nunes argues that his bill would not do either of those things. He claims that “H.R. 
1837 creates a framework for meaningful cooperation among stakeholders” and that 
“nothing in the bill would prevent completion of the BDCP.”4 However, he notes that “if 
this bill were enacted as written the construction of an isolated delta conveyance system 
will no longer be needed” because H.R. 1837 would allegedly increase exports enough to 
fill the need of the canal.5 Thus in a legal context, H.R. 1837 would overshadow the 
BDCP, if enacted. 
 However, the political climate suggests that the BDCP will prevail because it is 
on a faster track towards implementation. When H.R. 1837 passed in the Republican-run 
House, the White House put out a press release stating that “were the Congress to pass 
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H.R. 1837, the President’s senior advisors would recommend that he veto the bill.”6 
Given the Democrat-led Senate, H.R. 1837 is not likely to pass through Congress. The 
Obama Administration also stands behind the BDCP in the press release stating that 
“H.R. 1837 would undermine five years of collaboration between local, State, and 
Federal stakeholders to develop the Bay-Delta Conservation Plan.7 This of course means 
that the BDCP is likely to beat H.R. 1837 in head-to-head competition. However, even 
the BDCP has its flaws, as mentioned in Chapter 3.  
 
What the BDCP and H.R. 1837 Both Get Right and Wrong 
 The one positive attribute that both of these plans share is their dissatisfaction 
with the status quo. While both proposals are far from perfect, any action is better than no 
action as this point in time. Given the history of the Bay-Delta, the health of the estuary is 
quickly declining and it soon will not be able to deliver California its water needs. 
CALFED tried to make foundational changes to the Delta, but could not follow through. 
The current plans on the table suggest that California is seeking a solution, but these 
solutions are not revolutionary enough. 
  It is important to have a well-supported understanding of the Delta’s current state 
and its predicted future. The California Department of Water Resources published an 
executive summary of its Delta Risk Management Strategy – Phase I in February 2009. 
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Phase I was the conducting of a risk analysis and the release of a concluding report.8 The 
report “concludes that under business-as-usual practices, the Delta Region as it exists 
today is unsustainable” because “seismic risk, high water conditions, sea level rise and 
land subsidence threaten levee integrity.”9 A finding to support this estimate of risk states 
that “a major earthquake or magnitude 6.7 or greater in the vicinity of the Delta Region 
has a 62 percent probability of occurring sometime between 2003 and 2032.”10 The 
problem is that the Delta Regions has not experienced an earthquake of this magnitude 
yet and may not be equipped for such levee failures. The report essentially states that 
significant impacts to water exports, ecosystems, and municipal districts would be 
inevitable if these disasters occur. This is why action must be taken on the Delta.  
 While BDCP and H.R. 1837 propose action, several mutually negative aspects 
keep these plans from being the resolution to the Delta’s risk of failure. The first aspect 
that the two plans share is their reliance on previously proposed legislation. The BDCP 
reignites the peripheral canal discussion for the third time in the past five decades. When 
the environment became a concern, the idea was scrapped for its ambiguous 
environmental impacts. With the release of the BDCP Effects Analysis, the impacts are 
now clear. As much as California needs a reliable water supply, investment in old ideas 
does not reflect the new state of the Delta. If there is a possibility of a natural disaster 
causing levee failure in the Delta Region before 2032, then a 50-year long BDCP is not 
practical. H.R. 1837 experiences the same problem with regards to the Bay-Delta Accord. 
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The wonderful compromise of the agreement was indeed a model that should be 
replicated now, but the quantity of the allocations cannot remain the same as they were in 
1994 when population in California has increased by several million people and the 
amount of water in the Delta is different every year, but not on a steady rise to 
accommodate growth. The fact that H.R. 1837 idolizes the Bay-Delta Accord to the 
extent that its revival of the Accord trumps all existing water allocation regulations does 
not suggest that the bill is promoting sound science, like it claims. Despite allocations not 
always being fair, historical increases to restoration funds was based on societal increases 
in ecological knowledge. As people became more environmentally aware, priorities 
began to change. Necessary reform for the Delta should not be based on solely historical 
ideals; a true solution needs to incorporate understanding of what direction the Delta is 
heading and where California actually needs it to go in order to remain the life source of 
water.  
 Next, both of the plans promote the increase of water exports. While this is 
acceptable in the short-run, there will eventually not be enough water to continue 
increasing exports. As exports are maintained, true water conservation measures need to 
be implemented long-term. On the other hand, California can try to capture more water 
through storage facilities, but the unpredictability of precipitation makes that a risky and 
expensive alternative. Conservation of water is the only cost-effective, guaranteed way of 
preventing an increased reliance on water. “Conservation” here refers to practices that 
achieve a net savings in water, after factoring in costs of implementation.  
 When it comes to habitat and wildlife restoration, neither plan has a clear 
direction for restoration goals. The two proposals are on opposite sides of this problem. 
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The BDCP on the one hand intends to invest a significant amount of resources into 
habitat restoration, but does not set concrete, scientifically-backed standards. The 
construction of the canal is also potentially counterproductive to restoration goals, as 
mentioned in Chapter 3. There is a large uncertainty as to whether or not the net adverse 
effects of building a peripheral canal would be greater than the net beneficial effects of 
restoration projects under the BDCP. Although preparers of the BDCP will continue to 
refine the plan before implementation, keeping the canal project is likely to bring very 
little improvements to the plan. H.R. 1837 takes a completely different approach to 
restoration. Because of the unclear results of previous increases in restoration efforts, 
H.R. 1837 proposes to reduce environmental protection activities. This is a logically 
flawed approach to the ecological problem of the Delta. Without scientific evidence, the 
sponsors of H.R. 1837 try to justify taking water away from restoration just because the 
increased flows have not appeared to restore fish populations. While there is no 
immediate solution to this lack of clarity in restoration projects, science needs to play a 
bigger role in these types of policy decisions so that California is neither throwing money 
blindly into restoration nor giving too little to fish and wildlife.  
 The final reason, and perhaps the most difficult to fix reason for why both the 
BDCP and H.R. 1837 cannot resolve problems within the Delta is the utter lack of 
compromise that exists in both plans. In Chapter 3, BDCP was deemed unable to live up 
to its name. Critics of the BDCP see the obvious skew towards the peripheral canal in 
funding and proposed implementation. Despite the plan’s initially long list of planned 
goals and conservation objectives, conservation of habitat and species appear to play a 
distant second to the peripheral canal, which intends to ship water from the north to the 
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south. This creates a re-emerging issue with the peripheral canal: water users in Northern 
California have no reason to support it because it seems to be another water grab masked 
by promises of restoration. H.R. 1837 creates a similar problem because its sponsors all 
come from the same part of the Delta and the same political party. As much as the bill 
worships the Bay-Delta Accord, it certainly does very little to live up to the agreement’s 
example of compromise. If there is to be a new federal law regulating the Delta, it should 
have bi-partisan sponsorship. This is where CALFED had previously outshined the 
current two plans. CALFED participants had genuine interest in meeting the needs of all 
Delta stakeholders, with no political agenda attached; however, it could not meet its 
ambitious goal of harmony in the Delta.  
 
The Bay-Delta: To Be or Not To Be a Zero-Sum Game?  
 If CALFED could not solve the Delta problem and current proposals also lack the 
necessary tools to achieve a balanced solution, the future of the Delta looks bleak. Can a 
solution for the Delta ever be found? Michael Hanemann and Caitlin Dyckman are 
skeptical. In their article, “The San Francisco Bay-Delta: A failure of decision-making 
capacity”, they present the now commonly referred-to argument that the Delta is a zero-
sum game. A zero-sum game is a game theory concept where “a higher payoff value to 
one party implies a lower payoff value to one or more other parties”, resulting in a net 
change of zero.11 The authors argue that water transfer and supply issues in the Delta 
have remained “unresolved in California for six decades because (1) it involves a 
fundamental opposition of interests, (2) this opposition of interests makes a voluntary 
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solution unlikely because of the game-theoretic considerations described above, and (3) 
the SWRCB’s (State Water Resources Control Board) strategy of relying on voluntary 
agreement to resolve the issue is fundamentally misconceived and is, at some level, an 
abdication of its responsibility.”12 While Hanemann and Dyckman frame the Delta as a 
zero-sum game, they ultimately conclude that not only a lack of cooperation, but also a 
lack of authority has caused the on-going stalemates over the Delta. During the CALFED 
era, the Bay-Delta Program at the time was a wonderful “vision without authority”; 
overall, the SWRCB is attributed the most blame for inefficiently expecting stakeholders 
to voluntarily come to agreement on a solution.13 However, the nature of Delta 
negotiations arguably results in a zero-sum game where solutions do not exist, so an 
authority, like the SWRCB, should step in and ultimately make important decisions.  
 Kaveh Madani and Jay R. Lund agree with Hanemann and Dyckman’s 
conclusions, with the exception of the Delta actually being a zero-sum game.14 In their 
report, “California’s Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Conflict: from Cooperation to 
Chicken”, Madani and Lund use actual game theory tables to illustrate the Delta is not a 
zero-sum game. They argue that the “Delta problem seems unlikely to be a zero-sum 
game, as the Delta’s water, cost, land, and risk sharing are all linked with multiple 
decisions” made over differing amounts of time with various preferences; the mix of 
these variables is unlikely to cause a conflict.15 However, costs and risks that arise are 
likely to prevent “a cooperative solution even within a non-zero sum structure, as 
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happened in the CALFED framework.”16 The authors make an interesting observation 
here about how the CALFED framework was not a zero-sum framework. The program 
had all of the right objectives of collaboration, collective decision-making among 
stakeholders, and achievement of mutually beneficial processes; yet, CALFED was still 
unsuccessful.17 Madani and Lund find that a solution could not be accomplished because 
of the variables previously mentioned of time, preferences, and risk. Despite having the 
goal achieving a cooperative solution, this achievement “should not be expected in a 
reasonable timeframe”, meaning that the time it takes for a solution to actually be 
implemented is significantly longer than the amount of time stakeholders can wait and 
still see value in the cooperative solution.18 CALFED perfectly depicts this scenario. 
When it was first established, California was hopeful up and down the state. However, as 
time drew on and implementation was slow, stakeholders began to increasingly notice the 
financial risk and large amount of time put into the project. Eventually, these 
stakeholders transitioned from their initial sense of resolve to a feeling of serious risk. 
This feeling of bearing a lot of burden or being the victim is what the authors here define 
as “Chicken”.19 Hence, the authors describe the Delta problem as an evolution “from 
cooperation to Chicken”.20 The problem lies not in the proposed solutions, but rather the 
changing perception of what is at stake. Madani and Lund conclude that there either 
needs to be “powerful mechanisms which provide incentives for cooperation or penalties 
for deviation from cooperation” or better yet, “strong, responsible governing 
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mechanisms”, who must either “‘govern’ the Delta or eventually pay for absence of 
effective governance.”21 
 The points presented in both of these journal articles are similar and valid. Despite 
seeming like they disagreed on the zero-sum game, Madani and Lund’s argument can be 
interpreted more as an expansion of Hanemann and Dyckman’s argument. The attempts 
California and the U.S. have made towards resolving the Delta have seemed to be zero-
sum games because of how stakeholders perceive outcomes. In actuality, the payoff from 
the Delta can be quantified in the eyes of the recipient as any amount, in any proportion 
to the payoff for another recipient. Thus, the zero-sum game is merely an excuse for the 
fact that stakeholders refuse to cooperate after a certain point when self-interest decides 
that the risk is greater than the need to cooperate.  
 In response to questions presented at the start of the chapter: California’s water 
war over the Delta is far from over. Legislative attempts to fix the Delta have failed not 
because of inherent flaws, but rather the increasing unwillingness of stakeholders to 
compromise. This unwillingness stems from a sense of urgency from each stakeholder’s 
respective point of view. Environmentalists see the increasing need for restoration in the 
Delta; agricultural interests see the increasing need for sufficient water allocations to 
carry out their operations; and cities see the increasing need for water to accommodate 
population growth. With the Delta in high demand and quick decline, finding a solution 
has become increasingly difficult since the 1990s, but is still possible if stakeholders look 
past potential risks and truly cooperate with each other.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion  
 On March 30, 2012, the Sacramento Bee published an article with the headline, 
“Prestigious panel agrees: Delta is stressed, with no easy fix.” This news falls under the 
figurative “Truth Hurts” category of Delta information. Seventeen scientists from 
“various disciplines and regions of the country” participated in compiling the study over 
the course of two years under the National Research Council.1 The scientist panel deems 
the word “scarcity” “as a new watchword for its statewide water supplies. That doesn’t 
mean doing without, but recognizing everyone can’t always have all the water they 
want.”2  The report’s first definition is of the word “scarcity”; the description is as 
follows:  
“Scarcity means that there is simply not a sufficient quantity of some resource or 
commodity to satisfy all wants for it. Scarcity is a pervasive phenomenon and it is 
persistent. Water scarcity has always been a fact in California (save, perhaps, for 
unusually wet periods), and therefore the committee cannot evaluate the items in 
its charge without addressing scarcity. The magnitude or intensity of scarcity has 
grown over time and it continues to grow because demands have grown. There 
are numerous manifestations of scarcity. For example, legal rulings that require 
larger allocation of water to support fisheries and environmental flows are a 
manifestation of scarcity. Concerns about the Delta itself and differing positions 
about how Delta waters should be allocated are also manifestations of scarcity. 
The failure to acknowledge scarcity as a fact of life and to craft water plans and 
policies to address scarcity has made the management of Delta waters far more 
difficult than it needs to be.”3 
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The tone of the description sounds as if California is being told for the first time of its 
water scarcity by noting that it “has always been a fact”. What is even more striking is 
how the scientists selected the “allocation of water to support fisheries and environmental 
flows” to exemplify a manifestation of scarcity. The stakeholders who typically support 
those types of allocations are likely to be the ones reading the Sacramento Bee and this 
report. It appears that the scientists strategically want to convey that every single type of 
stakeholder is guilty for the historical poor management of the Delta. All who are 
concerned with the Delta and have a specific position on how to manage it contribute to 
the manifestation of scarcity because these people do not “acknowledge scarcity as a fact 
of life”. It is time to move away from self-interested opinions and move towards a 
community-oriented point of view on the Delta. 
 When the Central Valley Project and State Water Project were constructed, their 
main purpose was to provide water to the community of California. Despite the fact that 
building during that time what is now a declining water infrastructure may have helped 
manifest scarcity, the nation and the State of California united behind these projects. As 
realizations of environmental impacts emerged, stakeholders of Delta water began 
finding it harder and harder to see management of the Delta in the bigger picture of 
community. Interests became fragmented into three groups: environmental, agricultural, 
and municipal users. The first experience of scarcity California ever truly faced was the 
drought from 1987 to 1992, when the three groups of stakeholders each faced severe 
reductions in water. Fish and wildlife needs could not be undermined any longer as 
incrementally more species had to be listed as threatened or endangered, which led to the 
Central Valley Project Improvement Act. A sense of competition began to emerge 
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between different water users, so the Bay-Delta Accord had to be signed before matters 
worsened. This led to the development of a plan to mitigate these competing concerns. 
CALFED originally embodied a community-oriented ideal of ensuring sufficient water 
for everyone, but it did not incorporate a concept of scarcity. Back during the program’s 
planning stages in the 1990s, scarcity was even more of a foreign concept to California 
than it is now. The program failed to deliver on its cooperative ideals and stakeholders 
began to lose an understanding of what was compromise.  
 The current Bay-Delta Conservation Plan (BDCP) and Sacramento-San Joaquin 
Valley Water Reliability Act (H.R. 1837) are byproducts of this historical failure. Instead 
of fully capturing the cooperative essence of CALFED, both plans marginalize at least 
one set of water interests. The BDCP is trapped somewhere between wanting to deliver 
water to Southern California and wanting to restore wildlife and habitat; whereas, H.R. 
1837 is stuck in agriculture’s bitterness towards environmental protections and diversions 
of water to restoration projects. Both plans have a selective interpretation of “scarcity” 
for whomever their proposals aim to help. Back and forth in the political realm, elected 
officials and leaders of agencies debate without actually ever listening to the other side. 
The Delta appears to be in the grasps of incapable hands trying to split the estuary into 
pieces. The war over the Bay-Delta wages on with no end in sight.  
 The last thing the declining Delta needs to be is a battlefield. Despite cooperation 
appearing impossible due to polarized positions on the Delta, there is still hope for peace. 
In the long-term, the Delta needs its stakeholders to crave cooperation, community, and 
compromise; otherwise the state of California will remain divided with less and less 
water to drink.
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Figure 1. West Coast ocean non-Indian commercial Chinook and Coho harvest. 
 
 
 
 
